Abstract -
INTRODUCTION

O
ver the past few years, an enormous amount of scholarly and not-so-scholarly attention has been devoted to the problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce, to possible solutions to those problems, and, more recently, to the question of whether there is a "problem" at all. Rather my immediate focus is narrower: On the assumption that any broad-based solution to the problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce will require congressional action (whether in the form of federal legislation or congressional consent to a state compact), 3 the question I explore here is whether there are federal constitutional restraints that might limit Congress' ability to resolve these issues.
OVERVIEW
Any effort to design a solution to the problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce will almost certainly require congressional action of some kind. For example, most of the proposals for reform in this area have suggested that the states should be required to adopt uniform definitions of goods and services in taxing or exempting goods and services sold in electronic commerce and to impose only one rate per state. 4 It is difficult to imagine that this result can be achieved without congressional legislation. 5 Similarly, many observers 6 believe that any sensible approach to taxation of electronic commerce must modify the rule of Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 7 that out-of-state vendors without physical presence in the state may not be compelled to collect use taxes on sales to local consumers, regardless of the nature or extent of their sales into the state.
8 Congressional action will clearly be required to alter the rule of Quill, except in the unlikely event that the U.S. Supreme Court itself were to reconsider and overrule Quill.
COMMERCE CLAUSE CONSIDERATIONS
The question of whether Congress possesses power under the Commerce Clause to provide a comprehensive solution to the problem of state taxation of electronic commerce is, at first glance, an easy one. The Constitution grants Congress the power " [t] o regulate commerce . . . among the several States . . . ." 9 The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted that power in sweeping terms. Thus in the Shreveport Rate Case, 10 which sustained Congress' power to regulate local rates because they affected interstate rates, the Court declared:
It is unnecessary to repeat what has frequently been said by this court with respect to the complete and paramount character of the power confided to Congress to regulate commerce among the several States. It is of the essence of this power that, where it exists, it dominates. . . . By virtue of the comprehensive terms of the grant, the authority of Congress is at all times adequate to meet the varying exigencies that arise and to protect the national interest by securing the freedom of interstate commercial intercourse from local control.
11
The Court has also sustained as a legitimate exercise of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce (1) the amount of wheat a farmer can grow for his own consumption, 12 (2) discriminatory practices in local hotels and restaurants, 13 and (3) local criminal activity. 14 4 See, e.g., Hellerstein (1998; 1997a) ; McLure (1998) ; Wright and Rothstein (1999) . 5 The suggestion that the states can achieve this goal entirely through voluntary efforts is, in my view, unrealistic. One need look no further than our experience under the Multistate Tax Compact, which is designed to "promote uniformity or compatibility in significant components of tax systems," to justify such skepticism. Only about half the states have joined the Compact, although a number of others are associate members. Hellerstein and Hellerstein (1997) at 566. Moreover, in implementing the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act ("UDITPA"), which is embodied in the Compact, many states have adopted their own variations on the statute, id. at 567-69, thereby undermining the consistency that the Compact and the statute were designed to promote. Furthermore, the states differ in the extent to which they have adopted the Multistate Tax Commission's regulations interpreting UDITPA. Id. 6 Including this one. 7 504 U. S. 298 (1992) . 8 See footnote 4. 9 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 10 Houston E&W Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) . 11 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) . 13 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) ; Heart of Atlanta Hotel v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964) . 14 Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146 (1971) .
Furthermore, Congress' authority not only to restrict but also to expand state power to tax or regulate interstate commerce, by comparison to the restraints on such power that would otherwise exist under the so-called "dormant" Commerce Clause in the absence of congressional legislation, is well settled. Thus in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 15 the Court sustained a South Carolina insurance premiums tax imposed solely on foreign insurance companies-a levy that clearly would have been struck down under the Commerce Clause if Congress had not consented to such legislation in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In so holding, the Court declared:
The power of Congress over commerce exercised entirely without reference to coordinated actions of the states is not restricted, except as the Constitution expressly provides, by any limitation which forbids it to discriminate against interstate commerce and in favor of local trade. Its plenary scope enables Congress not only to promote but also to prohibit interstate commerce, as it has done frequently and for a great variety of reasons.
16
From the foregoing, one might reasonably conclude that there could be no serious objection to Congress' exercise of its power under the Commerce Clause to forge a comprehensive solution to the problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce. Because it has plenary power over the channels of interstate commerce, "Congress may keep the way open, confine it broadly or closely, or close it entirely," 17 subject only to the limitations that the Constitution imposes on Congress' own power. Indeed, the Court has explicitly indicated that Congress possesses power to legislate uniform state tax rules among the states--a subject of particular relevance to any legislative solution to the problems raised by sales and use taxation of electronic commerce. Thus, the Court has observed that " [i] 24 the Court held that Congress lacks power under the Commerce Clause to enact the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act, because it was not a regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. Do these decisions seriously inhibit Congress in its ability to fashion a solution to the problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce? In my judgment, the answer to this question is no, although they do suggest that certain forms of congressional action would lie outside Congress' commerce power.
Lopez
In Lopez, even though the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, it did so in an opinion that reaffirmed, rather than discredited, the essential contours of the Court's affirmative Commerce Clause doctrine. Thus the Court, after summarizing the "era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the previous defined authority of Congress under that Clause," 25 identified "three broad categories of activity that The Court found that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 fell within none of these categories. It clearly was not a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce nor was it an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity through the channels of commerce. The only close question, in the Court's opinion, was whether the activity that Congress sought to regulate "substantially affects" interstate commerce. Here, too, the Court concluded that the legislation fell outside of even its most expansive precedents-including those involving regulation of intrastate coal mining, intrastate extortionate credit transactions, restaurants using substantial interstate supplies, inns and motels catering to interstate guests, and production and consumption of homegrown wheat.
28
The Gun-Free School Zones Act, by contrast, "has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms." 29 Nor was there any "jurisdic- Lopez does not impose significant restraints on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to legislate regarding state taxation of electronic commerce. One cannot seriously maintain that electronic commerce does not "substantially affect" interstate commerce within the meaning of the precedents that the Court explicitly reaffirmed in Lopez. Indeed, if, as the Court reiterated, such activities as intrastate extortionate credit transactions, restaurants using substantial interstate supplies, inns and motels catering to interstate guests, and production and consumption of homegrown wheat "substantially affect" interstate commerce, electronic commerce would appear to be a "lesser included offense." Moreover, one could clearly draft congressional legislation as a regulation of the channels of interstate commerce-the Internet-that would fall squarely within another well-accepted basis for the exercise of the congressional commerce power.
Printz
In Printz, the Court held that certain provisions of the Brady Handgun Vio- tive solutions to the problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce have not seriously entertained the possibility of enlisting state and local personnel to implement a federal regulatory regime. Printz makes it clear that any such proposal would be dead on arrival from a constitutional standpoint, and we should not waste our time even considering any such proposal.
Second, Printz does not appear to jeopardize the constitutionality of the type of legislation that has been suggested in connection with state taxation of electronic commerce. For example, Congress could presumably enact a statute forbidding the states from imposing sales and use taxes on electronic commerce unless they (1) limited their tax to one rate per state, (2) adopted uniform definitions of taxable and nontaxable items prescribed by Congress, (3) simplified their administrative procedures for collecting taxes in ways specified by Congress, and (4) 144, 188 (1992) ). 40 120 S. Ct. 1740 Ct. (2000 .
Women Act, which grants "[a]ll persons within the United States . . . the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender." 41 Congress defined a "crim[e] of violence motivated by gender" as "a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." 42 As part of the Act, Congress authorized any person injured in violation of its provisions to sue for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages from the perpetrator of the injury. Congress explicitly identified the Commerce Clause as one of the sources of federal authority on which it relied in enacting the civil remedy provision of the Act ( § 13981).
43
When an alleged rape victim sued her alleged rapist under the Act, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground, among others, that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause to enact Section 13981. In addressing this question, the Court's analysis in Morrison closely tracked its analysis in Lopez. 44 In Morrison, the Court reiterated that in Lopez it had "'identified three broad categories of activities that Congress may regulate under its commerce power,'" 45 namely, (1) regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, (2) regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, and (3) regulation of activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
As in Lopez, however, the Court found in Morrison that the conduct at which the congressional legislation was directed fell within none of these categories. There was no contention that the regulation of gender-motivated violence could be justified as either a regulation of the channels of commerce or of the instrumentalities of, or persons or things in, interstate commerce. The only controverted (and controversial) question was whether gendermotivated violence substantially affected interstate commerce. The Court found that each of the critical factors that informed its resolution of this question in Lopez dictated the same result in Morrison. First, "the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue" in Lopez (possessing firearms in a school zone) " was central to our decision in that case."
46 Likewise, the gender-motivated crimes at issue in Morrison "are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity."
47 Second, the absence in Lopez of a "jurisdictional element, " 48 i.e., a concrete relationship between the regu-41 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994) . 42 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (1994) . 43 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1748. The other source of authority that Congress invoked for creating a federal civil rights cause of action under the Act was Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision authorizes Congress to "enforce" by "appropriate legislation" the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no state shall deprive any person of the right to due process or equal protection of the law. The Court found that Section 5 did not provide the requisite constitutional authority for § 13981 because the substantive provisions of the amendment are directed only at "state action," not at "merely private conduct," id. at 1756, and that, even if there were evidence of gender-based discrimination by state authorities:
Section 13981 is not aimed at proscribing discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself proscribe; it is directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias.
Id. at 1758. Like its fraternal twin Lopez, Morrison imposes no significant restraints on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to legislate regarding state taxation of electronic commerce, and for substantially the same reasons. By reaffirming its precedents that embrace an expansive view of activities substantially affecting interstate commerce as long as "the regulated activity was of an apparent commercial character," 51 the Court makes it plain in Morrison that it will not erect any new barriers to Congress' power to engage in true economic regulation under the Commerce Clause. It is hard to conceive of any subject of regulation that falls more squarely within the concept of "economic activity" than electronic commerce. Moreover, even if there were some doubt as to whether a restraint on state taxing power over arguably "local" taxable events would fall within Congress' power to regulate activities substantially affecting interstate commerce-a doubt I do not share for reasons suggested above, 52 one could, as I have also suggested above, clearly draft congressional legislation as a regulation of the channels of interstate commerce-the Internet-that would fall within another well-accepted basis for the exercise of the congressional commerce power. The DPPA arose out of Congress' concern that many states, which routinely require drivers and automobile owners to furnish personal information to state motor vehicle departments, had been selling this personal information to individuals and businesses. In adopting the DPPA, Congress regulated the disclosure of such personal information. Among other things, the DPPA established a regulatory scheme that restricted the states' ability to disclose a driver's personal information without the driver's consent. Personal information was defined as "any information that identifies an individual," with an excep- tion for "information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver's status." 55 The DPPA's ban did not apply to drivers who consented to release of their data, and the Act established rules governing how such consent could lawfully be obtained. The DPPA also contained a number of exceptions to the prohibition against nonconsensual disclosures.
South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of the DPPA as "incompatible with the principles of federalism."
56 The Court first addressed the claim that Congress lacked the authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the DPPA. Relying on its opinion in Lopez, where it had identified three broad categories of activity that Congress could regulate under its commerce power, 57 the Court found that the personal information that the DPPA regulates fell within the second category of activity that Congress could regulate under its commerce power--"things in interstate commerce." 58 The Court observed that the personal information that the states have historically sold was used by insurers, direct marketers, and others engaged in interstate commerce to contact drivers with customized solicitations. The information was also used in the stream of commerce by various public and private entities for matters related to interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Court concluded: "Because drivers' information is, in this context, an article of commerce, its sale or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional regulation."
59
The Condon Court's treatment of Lopez supports the view that Lopez (and, by implication, Morrison) are no obstacle to congressional legislation regulating state taxation of electronic commerce. Since electronic commerce invariably involves "an article of commerce" (e.g., the purchase and/or transfer of a digital or nondigital product over the Internet) there can be no question that "its sale or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional regulation." Lopez (and, by implication Morrison) are therefore no more an obstacle to congressional legislation limiting state taxation of electronic commerce than Lopez was an obstacle in Condon to congressional legislation limiting state sale of personal information in interstate commerce.
The fact that Congress possessed legislative authority over the subject matter of the DPPA did not end the dispute in Condon. In Printz, the Court held the Brady Handgun Prevention Act invalid not because Congress lacked authority over commerce in handguns but rather because the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism preclude the Federal Government from "issu [ing] The Court's decision in Condon reaffirms the conclusion that Printz does not constitute a significant limitation on federal legislation directed to state taxation of electronic commerce. As noted above, 64 the type of federal legislation that has been suggested in connection with state taxation of electronic commerce does not "require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens," "to enact any laws or regulations," or to "require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals." Rather it would simply forbid the states from taxing electronic commerce unless they complied with congressionally prescribed conditions, a traditional form of federal legislation that lies outside the purview of Printz. Ct. 2240 . 79 Id. at 2266. 80 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908) . 81 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000) .
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment unless such legislation is "appropriate legislation" to remedy substantive violations of the amendment. In order for legislation to satisfy the latter standard, " [t] here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."
82
Applying this "congruence and proportionality test," the Court concluded that the ADEA was not "appropriate legislation" under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the Court observed that age discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if it is unrelated to a legitmate state interest and that it had in fact rejected claims that age discrimination violated the Equal Protection Clause on three separate occasions. Hence, the ADEA's broad bar against all age discrimination "prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard."
83 Second, the Court found little evidence that states were in fact engaged in age discrimination and that "Congress' 1974 extension of the Act to the States was an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem."
84 Accordingly, the Court concluded "[i]n light of the indiscriminate scope of the Act's substantive requirements, and the lack of evidence of widespread and unconstitutional age discrimination, . . . the ADEA is not a valid exercise of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."
85 The ADEA's purported abrogation of the states' sovereign immunity was therefore invalid.
What are the implications of all this for congressional legislation directed to state taxation of electronic commerce? First, it is apparent that these decisions deprive Congress of the power to create a federal or state judicial remedy for private litigants against nonconsenting states to vindicate whatever rights it may establish under its commerce powers. Second, it seems equally apparent that Congress would be unsuccessful in attempting to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment for these purposes. I doubt that there is any more evidence in the context of state taxation of electronic commerce than there was in the context of state patent infringement in Florida Prepaid or of age discrimination in Kimel that the states have caused "'widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights' of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation." 86 Does this mean that we should fold our tents and go home because, whatever substantive rules Congress may enact with respect to state taxation of electronic commerce under the Commerce Clause, it is helpless when it comes to creating a federal or state remedy for private litigants to enforce those rules against nonconsenting states? The answer, in my judgment, is an unequivocal "no." For one thing, as the Court itself observed, the existence of sovereign immunity "does not confer upon the State a concomitant right to disregard the Constitution or valid 82 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) . 83 Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 647. 84 Id. at 649. 85 Id. at 650. It is worth noting that the Court's conclusion that Congress lacked the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the provisions of the ADEA to the states did not overrule its earlier determination that Congress possessed power under the Commerce Clause to extend the ADEA's provisions to the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983) . Nevertheless, the Commerce Clause, as distinguished from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, does not provide Congress with authority to override the state's sovereign immunity. See footnotes 70-72 and accompanying text. 86 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Bd. v College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 Ct. , 2202 . federal law." 87 The states and their officers are bound by their obligations under the Constitution, and one can not assume they will lightly disregard those obligations even in the absence of a judicially enforceable remedy.
Furthermore, as the Court also observed, there are several avenues for judicial enforcement of whatever rights Congress may create with respect to state taxation of electronic commerce under its Article I powers. As the Court observed in Alden, there is no constitutional bar to an action brought by the United States in federal or state court to vindicate these rights and Congress could surely authorize such suits in any legislation directed to state taxation of electronic commerce. Moreover, private litigants can sue state officers for injunctive or declaratory relief to enforce federal rights in federal or state court without trenching on state sovereign immunity from suit.
88
More importantly, however, is the simple fact that states have generally consented to be sued in their courts with respect to state tax controversies. 89 Consequently, in most instances at least, taxpayers will be able to vindicate whatever federal rights Congress may create pursuant to its commerce power under existing state remedial procedures. This is precisely what happens today when taxpayers sue in state court to vindicate their rights under such federal statutes as Public Law 86-272. 90 In short, there does not appear to be a legitimate concern that private litigants will be without a judicial remedy to enforce whatever substantive rules Congress may create under its commerce power with respect to electronic commerce.
Finally, and most importantly, Congress could address this issue by requiring the states to waive their immunity from suit in return for a relaxation of existing dormant Commerce Clause restraints on jurisdiction to impose sales and use tax collection obligations. The Court has recognized "a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests."
91 For example, "Congress may attach conditions to the receipt of federal funds;" 92 it may "offer States the choice of regulating . . . activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation;" 93 and it may employ "any other permissible method of encour-87 Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 Ct. , 2266 . 88 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908) . 89 Indeed, it is for this reason that the question of state sovereign immunity in tax cases has arisen in federal rather than state court. See South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama, 119 S. Ct. 1180 Ct. , 1184 aging a State to conform to federal policy choices." 94 In short, Congress possesses the power to makes the states an offer they cannot refuse.
Accordingly, under these principles, Congress could condition the congressional overruling of Quill on the states' consent to suit for enforcement of whatever other rules Congress may provide limiting the states' power to tax electronic commerce. For example, if Congress were to establish a federal oversight commission charged with the duty of maintaining uniformity in any new harmonized state sales tax system it might see fit to require as a prerequisite to the relaxing the rule of Quill, Congress could insist at the same time that any state wishing to participate in the new system (and enjoy the right to compel remote sellers to collect their use taxes) must waive its sovereign immunity from suit before the commission. This should allay any concern about creating a right without a remedy. Moreover, such a requirement would satisfy the constitutional requirement of an "effective waiver"-the "'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. ' it earmarked some of the surcharge for a federal escrow account; and it authorized the federal government to distribute money from the fund to states that achieved certain disposal goals. The Court characterized the first step as "an unexceptional exercise of Congress' power to burden interstate commerce," 101 observing that, " [w] hile the Commerce Clause has long been understood to limit the States' ability to discriminate against interstate commerce, that limit may be lifted, as it has been here, by an expression of 'unambiguous intent' of Congress." 102 The Court viewed the second step as "no more than a federal tax on interstate commerce." 103 And it found that the third was an acceptable "conditional exercise of Congress' authority under the Spending Clause" 104 because it met the four criteria the Court had articulated for evaluating the validity of such measures: the expenditure was for the general welfare; the conditions imposed were unambiguous; they were reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure; and they did not violate any independent constitutional prohibition.
105
Under analogous reasoning, Congress could authorize the states to burden commerce by (1) overruling Quill; (2) earmarking state tax collections from remote sellers to a federal escrow account; and (3) providing for distribution of the funds from such account only to states that complied with a federally-prescribed harmonized sales tax regime.
The second set of incentives the Court approved in New York conferred upon states that complied with federal radioactive waste disposal regulations the option to refuse to accept waste from other states that were not in compliance with federal guidelines. The Court declared that " [w] here federal regulation of private activity is within the scope of the Commerce Clause, we have recognized the ability of Congress to offer the States the choice of regulating the activity according to federal standards or having the state law preempted by federal regulation."
106
Under analogous reasoning, Congress could offer the states the choice of taxing electronic commerce according to federal standards-Congress plainly has the power to regulate the "private activity" of electronic commerce-or having state taxation of electronic commerce preempted by federal legislation.
There are, of course, limits to the "incentives" approach to inducing states to conform to federal policies. In New York, the Court invalidated a third set of incentives that offered the states the following choice: They could regulate pursuant to congressional direction or they could take title to and possession of radioactive waste generated within their borders and become liable for all damage that waste generators might suffer as a result of the states' failure to act promptly. Under these circumstances, the Court concluded, "Congress has crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion," 107 because Congress lacked the power to compel either choice independently. In contrast to the incentives described above, where at least one of alternatives clearly lay within Congress' commerce or spending power, here threat, should the States not regulate according to one federal instruction, of simply forcing the States to submit to another federal instruction. A choice between two constitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all.
108
In short, under New York and kindred cases, Congress possesses considerable power, through positive and negative reinforcement, to persuade the states to follow federally prescribed guidelines in taxing electronic commerce.
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to arguing that Congress lacks the power under the Commerce Clause to fashion a broad solution to the problem of state taxation of electronic commerce, one might also contend that such legislation would purport to authorize violations of the Court's due process doctrine and that, in contrast to Congress' power to consent to what otherwise would be violations of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Congress lacks the authority to consent to due process violations.
The question must be answered in two parts. First, would the congressional legislation authorize violations of the Due Process Clause and, if so, does Congress have the power to eliminate the due process bar?
The answer to the first part of the question depends on whether a state would have the "definite link" or "minimum connection" that the Due Process Clause requires "between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax." 109 The Court in Quill construed this requirement to remove any condition that the "link" or "connection" be physical: "The requirements of due process are met irrespective of a corporation's lack of physical presence in a State."
110 What is required is that the out-of-state taxpayer "purposefully direct" its activities towards residents of the taxing state. 111 Whether the congressional legislation would satisfy this criterion would, of course, depend on the precise nexus requirements in the federal legislation and on the particular facts of the case. In other words, even if the legislation authorized states to require collection of use taxes that, in some circumstances, would exceed state power under existing due process doctrine, the statute would arguably be invalid only in those circumstances. It would not provide a basis for attacking the legislation on its face, since in most of its applications it would likely be unobjectionable.
Even assuming that, in some circumstances, congressional legislation might authorize the exercise of state taxing power that exceeds state authority under the Due Process Clause, it is an open question whether such legislation would nevertheless be sustained. The Court in dicta has declared that "while Congress has plenary power to regulate commerce among the States and thus may authorize state actions that burden interstate commerce, it does not similarly have the power to authorize violations of the Due Process Clause." 112 Nevertheless, a strong case can be made that Congress has power to consent to violations of the Due Process Clause so long as they are not restraints by which Congress itself is bound. 113 Under this theory, Congress can authorize what would otherwise be federalismbased violations of the Due Process Clause but not Due Process violations of individual rights.
In the end, it seems unlikely that the U.S. Supreme Court would hold that the framers of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment left the nation powerless, short of a constitutional amendment, to legislate an administratively workable solution to the problem of state taxation of electronic commerce, despite the joint exercise by Congress and the states of their respective powers under the Constitution. 114 Moreover, even if portions of such legislation were held to violate the Due Process Clause as applied, the lion's share of any such legislation would be invulnerable to due process attack on its face or as applied.
CONCLUSION
Congress possesses ample power to forge a comprehensive solution to the problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce. There is no doubt that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to legislate with respect to virtually any aspect of electronic commerce. It may restrict the states' power to tax such commerce in ways that Congress finds burdensome, prescribe the precise conditions under which the states may tax such commerce, and it may permit the states to tax such commerce in ways that the Commerce Clause currently forbids. Although Congress may not create federal or state jurisdiction over nonconsenting states to enforce whatever rights it may create under legislation addressed to electronic commerce, the states' courthouses are generally open for the vindication of such rights and Congress could insist that the states waive their sovereign immunity to suit in return for a relaxation of the Commerce Clause restraints on their power to tax remote sellers. Indeed, Congress possesses broad authority to provide incentives, short of outright coercion, to induce states to conform to federal policy choices. There is an open question whether Congress may override any due process limitations on state taxing power, but, even if it may not, these restraints are not extensive and, in any event, would likely affect any broad-based legislation only in limited circumstances on an "as applied" basis.
